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tt
State legislatures have started to convert 1990 census data into new districts
and the political maneuvering has begun.' Accusations about partisan or
racially motivated gerrymandering have begun to fill the op-ed pages.2 Mean-
while, in the popular press there is hand-wringing about the expense and waste
of campaigning for elective office, the lack of responsiveness of legislatures,
and the corrupting influence of special interests in politics.3 Like most contro-
versial social issues of our day, many of these concerns about regulating the
electoral process will end up in court.4
The articles in this issue of the Yale Law & Policy Review raise questions
about partisan gerrymandering, minority vote dilution, campaign finance, and
voter mobilization. Together they propose a sizeable agenda directed at the
further regulation of American political processes. Scholars and policy makers
will be interested in subjects covered by these articles because of the impact
electoral and political reforms could have on how well Americans are repre-
sented in government.
t Doctoral candidate, Jurisprudence and Social Policy, University of California, Berkeley. I wish to
thank the Institute of Governmental Studies, the Institute for Humane Studies, and the John M. Olin
Foundation for their generous support.
tt Director, Institute of Governmental Studies and Professor of Political Science, University of
California, Berkeley.
1. See, e.g., Bob Benson, New Boundaries Set in Hawaii; Three Big States Up Next, CONo. Q. WKLY.
REP., July 27, 1991 at 2098-99 (discussing the timetable for current and upcoming congressional redistrict-
ing plans); George Curry, Urban Rivals, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 6, 1991, at 16 (describing competition
between minorities in New York's redistricting).
2. See, e.g., Don't Count Out the Nation's Cities, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 17, 1991, at 16.
3. See, e.g., Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, The Best Way to Clean Up Congress, READER'S
DIGEST, March, 1991, at 112-13; Paul Starr, A World Unlocked, 1 AMERICAN PROSPECT 7, 8-9 (1990).
4. Indeed, the court battles have already started. For example, when the Illinois state legislature failed
to redraw congressional districts, the project went straight to the federal courts. See Elizabeth Brackett,
Redrawing the Lines, Report for MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour (July 22, 1991); see also Robert Kagan,
Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369, 369-75, 379-406
(1991) (exploring why so many social issues in the United States end up in adversary proceedings).
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We, however, are primarily interested in how courts will receive these
articles. In fact, many of these articles address themselves to courts by propos-
ing reform of the U.S. electoral system through the application by judges of
what are hoped to be judicially manageable standards. We, too, focus on the
judiciary because courts, for better or worse, will establish many of the
policies in this area.
Part I of this brief overview and introduction considers the decline of the
political question doctrine as it relates to this cluster of issues, and recom-
mends judicial decisionmaking guided by multiple criteria as contrasted with
reliance on any single, "judicially manageable," standard. Part II argues that
multiple criteria are needed for court decisions about electoral politics because
of a lack of consensus about political representation, and because any single
criterion fails adequately to consider trade-offs that exist among relevant
desiderata. We illustrate this point by discussing the competing criteria sur-
rounding the issues of (1) money and politics, (2) minority representation, and
(3) vote dilution and gerrymandering. All three subjects are discussed at length
by other articles in this issue. Finally, we conclude in part III that the use of
multiple criteria may help courts deal with "political questions" more compe-
tently to the extent that courts believe they should deal with such questions at
all.
I. THE DECLINE OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
AND THE RISE OF JUDICIALLY MANAGEABLE STANDARDS
When litigation is the method of reform, it is traditional to defer to those
ingenious recommendations which offer judges a single, clear criterion to
identify evils and devise remedies. Our tentative conclusion is that in some
cases multiple criteria, which may not be quite so clear, are better.5 The
advantages of multiple criteria over a single criterion are most apparent when
the problems in need of remedy involve social and political circumstances that
are important to the life of the community, but which nest in ways that are not
fully understood, or when solutions promise to cause a cascade of consequenc-
es that cannot be easily foreseen.
Judicial intervention into political processes was once well understood to
carry such risks. Judges honored the political question doctrine by refusing
5. Our term "multiple criteria" (as contrasted with single criterion) merely suggests that judges need
to recognize and account for the trade-offs between competing criteria (none of which is obviously
inappropriate) in deciding how to resolve disputes about the regulation of representative government. As
we discuss in detail infra, adherence to financial equality among candidates fails to accommodate concerns
for competitive elections, adherence to exact equality between district populations may fail to accommodate
concerns for professional leadership in the legislature, etc. Given such trade-offs, multiple criteria, rather
than one single criterion, have to be considered as a way of structuring judicial decisionmakingin regulating
politics.
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jurisdiction over certain cases. Often these cases highlighted the unaccountabili-
ty of appointed judges to democratic processes, and the difficulty of finding
satisfactory and clear legal standards to apply to political behavior.6
Recently, fights over the justiciability of political questions surrounding
elections have been resolved largely in favor of judicial action.7 Since regula-
tion of the political process is a relatively new line of work for judges, they,
and authors such as those represented in this issue, are still at the stage of
trying to fashion clear, "judicially manageable" tools that will separate permis-
sible from impermissible behavior and point toward appropriate remedies. By
advocating attention to multiple grounds of permissibility, we necessarily differ
with some of the articles that follow. In our opinion, the very clarity with
which the authors construct problems and solutions ignores too many probable
pitfalls and introduces too much toxic material into the political system in the
guise of remedies.
We know that laws governing the composition of districts, the finance of
campaigns, or the registration of voters undoubtedly affect who runs for public
office and who wins. There is, however, no single plausible explanation for
how these laws affect those processes, or how they should. For instance, given
the need to mobilize voters, and the fact that the individuals least likely to vote
are those lowest on the socio-economic scale,' can we say unequivocally that
the expenditure of money in democratic politics operates against the principle
of equality?9 Given the dangers of stalemate ever-present in proportional repre-
sentation systems, can we confidently dismiss single-member districts and
plurality (i.e., first-past-the-post) voting systems as undemocratic?"0 Careful
exploration of issues of this sort has yielded many surprises.
This may not bring much solace to judges who are today faced with the
task of choosing from among contested districting plans, or ruling on the
constitutionality of legislation meant to curb some forms of campaign expendi-
6. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, 183-98 (2d ed. 1986).
7. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); BICKEL, supra note 6, at 190-92. See also ALEXANDER
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970) (describing the contemporary history
of judicial activism and discussing its impact on egalitarianism).
8. See, e.g., RAYMOND WOLFINGER & STEVEN ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 13-36 (1980); Dayna
Cunningham, Who Are to Be the Electors? A Reflection on the History of Voter Registration in the United
States, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 370 (1991).
9. Expenditures of large amounts of money may be needed to mobilize voters from lower socio-
economic echelons; the resulting mobilization may strengthen those individuals politically. One could argue
that in such a case it is the expenditure of money in campaigns which creates more equality. See Nelson
W. Polsby, Moving Toward Equality in Campaign Finance?, in POWER, INEQUALITY, AND DEMOCRATIC
POLITICS 263 (Ian Shapiro & Grant Reeher eds., 1988) (advantages of money in elections may reach point
of diminishing returns).
10. When proportional representation systems fail to produce decisive majorities, i.e., when there is
stalemate, the strategic behavior of minority parties in the formation of legislative coalitions can give them
power wildly disproportionate to their size. Cf DOUGLAS RAE, POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL
LAWS 170-76 (1967) (discussing structural instability of legislative coalitions in proportionally represented
multiparty legislatures without decisive majorities).
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ture-and who need to do so before the next round of elections. Multiple
criteria may require more of judges than the application of bright lines and
clear standards. But, multiple criteria need not dissuade judges from seeking
to correct wrongs.
As Martin Shapiro has said, courts often find themselves "in a position to
identify a wrong without being able to define the right. Finding themselves in
this position, they are ethically entitled to, and in fact do, intervene against
the wrong."" Thus, when a court knows that special interests are purchasing
votes in this legislature, that malapportionment allows consistent minority
control of that state assembly, that racial or ethnic minorities are systematically
excluded from representation on this county's board of supervisors, then
straightforward remedial action can be contemplated. We suggest that if courts
address the particular problem at hand by borrowing from a range of criteria,
they are less likely to introduce anomalies and difficulties into contexts not
contemplated by the facts before them.
II. WHY MULTIPLE CRITERIA
The desire that judges proceed cautiously when they decide questions
related to political processes like elections does not require resorting to an
unprincipled majoritarianism."2 But it does require the recognition that some
issues are intractable to solutions that invoke just one sovereign principle
because (1) there is no agreement on what the proper guiding principles should
be, or (2) the principles most obviously applicable can be counted among many
relevant considerations.13
Our advocacy of multiple criteria stems from these same concerns. First,
there is no theoretical consensus regarding electoral structures from which to
derive a single principle or criterion for regulating elections. Second, even if
we posit a principle or criterion, there may be many means to the stipulated
end, as well as many other highly relevant factors worthy of consideration.
What follows then is not a shopping list of criteria from which to choose.
Rather, we try to highlight some of the problems we perceive in single-
criterion solutions in the areas of campaign finance, minority representation,
and vote dilution. We discuss the "one person, one vote" doctrine extensively
11. Martin Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L. REV. 227,
228 (1985).
12. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 6 at 28, 65-72, 244-72 (discussing tension between fundamental
principles and the "practice of democracy" in constitutional adjudication); HARRY WELLINGTON, INTER-
PRETING THE CoNsTITUTION 140-58 (1990) (examining use of public values in constitutional adjudication
and how constitutional adjudication shapes public values); Louis Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review:
Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1265, 1303 (1961).
13. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 185.
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in order to illustrate what a jurisprudence of political regulation might offer
if it made more extensive use of multiple criteria.
A. No Theoretical Consensus on Politics
Thinking about regulation inspires us to think about the economy, with its
generally accepted criterion of efficiency, or, as economists would have it,
Pareto efficiency. Behind this particular view of efficiency lies an elaborate
and carefully articulated theory which describes how competitive markets with
full information tend to move.' 4 However, the theory also informs us that
markets can fail to move toward Pareto efficiency when there is less than full
information, when competition is otherwise hindered, or when individuals do
not recognize the full benefits or harms of their transactions."1 For such
instances the theory suggests that regulation of pure market forces might be
desirable. 6 But even with a basic theoretical consensus, the practice of regulat-
ing the economy has been fraught with debate and contention.
Can we transplant this powerful intellectual machinery to the realm of
political regulation? Assume that we could agree that what we wanted to
maximize in democratic politics was equal representation of citizens. A theory
of representation would help us better to understand what moved us toward
or away from optimal representation, both in elections and in legislatures. The
theory might indicate failures which could be corrected through regulation of
one type or another. But no such generally accepted theory exists. Debates
over representation have raged as long as representational structures have
existed, and we do not foresee their resolution in the near future.' 7 A defensi-
ble regulatory regime should take account of the lack of common ground on
such fundamental theoretical issues.
B. More Than One Story
Several of the articles which follow use rhetorically powerful complaints
about some illness of American democracy as a backdrop for the application
of a preferred remedy. Some articles argue that the courts, armed with proper
premises, will see past the self-interest and confusion which keep legislatures
from making the "right" decisions in the first place. But there is more than
14. See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 557-73 (1989);
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 44-45 (1988).
15. See, e.g., PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 14 at 586-88, 591-621; COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 14 at 45-49.
16. See, e.g., PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 14 at 622-30.
17. Some of the varieties of thought concerning representation can be seen in NOMOs X: REPRESENTA-




one way to construct and remedy many of the problems complained of, as at
least two of the articles herein recognize. Kenneth Gross focuses attention on
enforcement, arguing that any changes in the substance of campaign finance
laws will be ineffectual unless the Federal Election Commission enforcement
process is improved."8 Stephen Gottlieb demonstrates that any attempt to
regulate politics calls forth competing theories of democracy, equality, and
legitimacy. 9 Hence Gottlieb cautions us that electoral reforms, particularly
those which purport to increase purity in the campaign process, will not neces-
sarily give us better government or more democracy.20
1. Money and politics. David Cole's article, First Amendment Antitrust:
The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance,21 assumes that money does
not mix with democratic politics and that it should be more tightly regulated.
Hence, the article largely agrees with the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce2 to uphold Michigan's ban on
independent expenditures by corporations. In Cole's view, the case "reflect[s]
the Court's first serious acknowledgement" of the "structural threat of a
monopolized marketplace of ideas."' Although Cole thinks that Austin did
not reach far enough to curb the influence of wealth in politics, he argues that
this
does not necessarily mean that the initial impulse to respond to the distorting
effects of wealth is wrong. It only reveals how difficult it is in a capitalist society
to offset the distorting effects of unequal private resources on public debate. More-
over, . . .the problem of wealth distorting speech is so widespread and deeply
ingrained that attempts to respond to it will inevitably run up against competing
constitutional interests. But the difficulty of the task does not mean it should be
abandoned .....
So Cole urges upon the courts a single criterion of equalization, a doctrine of
judicial antitrust in the marketplace of ideas.
How much money in the political system is "too much"? Cole argues,
along with the Austin Court, that politics needs protection from the corrosive
and distorting effects of money.' That view presumes the existence of some
18. Kenneth Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign Finance Rules: A System in Search of Reform, 9
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 279 (1991).
19. Stephen E. Gottlieb, Election Reform and Democratic Objectives-Match or Mismatch? 9 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 205 (1991).
20. Id.
21. 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 236 (1991).
22. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
23. Cole, supra note 21, at 237.
24. Id. at 269-70.
25. Id. at 264-71; Austin, 110 S.Ct. at 1401. Far more money is spent each year to influence and
inform arguably less important decisions than candidate selection. All campaigning for presidential
candidates in the 1988 elections cost nearly $394 million. NELSON W. POLSBY & AARON WILDAVSKY,
PRESMENTIAL ELECTIoNs 361-62 n.24 (8th ed. 1991). By contrast, the costs for advertising breakfast cereal
in America in 1988 totalled nearly $835 million. Ad $ Summary (BAR/LNA Multi-Media Service) 12
(Leading National Advertisers Jan.-Dec. 1988).
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baseline, some ideal form, which is being distorted. But what is the baseline?
What is the ideal? Is it a politics greatly influenced by people having non-
monetary resources, such as mobilized retirees and students? These presumably
would be among the most politically influential groups if the money of working
individuals is replaced by a non-monetized politics of pure participation.26
A clear and precise criterion of "equalization" poses problems because
many attributes and advantages are differentially distributed, and it may be that
money actually operates to balance them.27 The most important of these is
incumbency, which by its nature tends to give advantage only to one contestant
at a time. Writers with strong regulatory impulses seize upon money as the
thing to regulate because it is easy to see when money is distributed unequally
among candidates.28 It is harder, however, to see when the candidate with
less money actually has enough, or when the excess amount of money in the
hands of the richer candidate produces diminishing returns.29 This illustrates
how relying on one clear, enforceable criterion of equalization can inadvertent-
ly exacerbate other prevailing inequalities.
Another justification of campaign finance regulation stems from the concern
that expenditures of money on political activity might involve corruption of
the political process in the form of bribery. Although the Supreme Court has
recognized a compelling state interest in curbing corruption or the appearance
of corruption through campaign finance regulation, that interest must always
26. When the case of Buckley v. Valeo was before the federal appellate court the plaintiffs argued (we
think correctly) that
[ilt is . . . too crabbed a notion of the political process to restrain people from demonstrating
the intensity of their conviction on particular issues. Indeed, it is hard to see how a democratic
nation can have a stable government if it does not permit intensity of feeling as well as numbers
of adherents to be reflected in the political process... Campaign contributions represent a means
by which intensity can be shown....
Brief of the Plaintiffs at 105, Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975) aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) quoted in J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?,
85 YALE L.J. 1013-14 (1976). See also ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 90-123
(1956) (discussing need to account for intensity of preference in democracy). So long as money is (1)
unequally distributed in the underlying population, and (2) the only way to demonstrate intensity of interest
in politics, monetary differences invite regulation to increase equality of influence on decisions by voters.
Nobody questions that most U.S. electorates meet the first criterion; the second criterion is another matter.
As one of us argues elsewhere, once multiple forms of influence are recognized, restrictions on one form
of influence merely increases the strength of the others. Polsby, supra note 9.
27. Polsby, supra note 9.
28. See, e.g., ELIZABETH DREw, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO CORRUPTION (1983)
(asserting that money in election campaigns breaks down deliberative constitutional democracies and
pleading for specific reforms including public financing with spending limits); Federal Election Reform,
1973: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Comm. on Rules and
Administration, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 85-95, 265-81 (1973) (testimony of Fred Wertheimer of Common
Cause advocating federal limits on campaign spending and private campaign contributions).
29. See, e.g., Polsby, supra note 9, at 270 (suggesting that 1972 Nixon presidential campaign reached
point of diminishing returns); See generally GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
(1980) (elections respond to money in the hands of challengers, but not incumbents).
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be balanced against the rights of free speech implicated by such regulation.3"
It is important to note, however, that of late no corruption by means of
campaign finance has been proved to exist.31
So far, the growing empirical literature on how money influences legisla-
tive politics indicates that the link between finance and policy is weak at
best,32 and just as likely as not runs opposite to the direction commonly
supposed; a legislator receives contributions because he or she already supports
a particular policy, not vice versa.a Thus, concerns about the effects of
contributions on legislative outcomes may not justify elaborate and onerous
regulations on campaign finance. Perhaps deregulation, with effective disclo-
sure, would be better.
2. Minority representation. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended,34
asks courts to play a large role in increasing minority representation.3" None-
theless, more than one story can be told about increasing minority influence
in legislative bodies. A current litigation strategy attempts to concentrate
minority voters into a single district so that they are assured of getting at least
one representative.36 But one representative in a legislative body may not be
enough to influence policy. 37 Measured by the policy outcomes for the minor-
30. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). But see Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110
S.Ct. 1391, 1397 (1990) (Marshall, J.) (defining corruption as "the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of [corporate] wealth" rather than simply financial quid pro quo corruption); Harold
Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 345 (1977) (questioning wisdom of Buckley
Court's decision to restrict untested campaign finance laws).
31. The "appearance" of corruption, frequently cited as something equally debilitating to the political
system as corruption itself, deserves separate consideration-indeed more consideration than we can accord
it here. It is commonly invoked in the passive voice, as though it would be of no moment to whom a given
set of circumstances appeared to be corrupt, or on what grounds. Given other presumptions of Anglo-
American jurisprudence, such as the presumption of innocence under a variety of circumstances, the
construction of public policy and of a regime of judicially managed regulation of the political process on
the basis of something as vague and easily manipulable by anybody with access to a soap box or an editorial
page as an "appearance" of corruption seems highly questionable. Yet it is rarely questioned.
32. See, e.g., FRANK SORAUF, MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 312 & n.26 (1988). After reviewing
the literature on the consequences of campaign financing, Sorauf concludes that "there are simply no data
in the systematic studies that would support the popular assertions about the 'buying' of the Congress or
about any other massive influence of money on the legislative process." Id. at 312.
33. Id.; cf. JACOBSON, supra note 29, at 51-104 (1980) (exploring theories on who contributes to
political campaigns and why).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
35. Id. See also ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN
MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 192-93 (1987) (indicating that litigation under revised § 2 of Voting Rights Act
has been voluminous and successful for minority plaintiffs); BARBARA Y. PHILLIPS, HOW TO USE SECTION
5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (3d. ed. 1983) (discussing administrative and judicial preclearance, and
litigation strategies under §§ 2 and 5 of Voting Rights Act).
36. See, e.g., Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cen. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 681 (1991) (upholding lower court redistricting plan creating a Hispanic majority in one supervisorial
district).
37. See, e.g., RUFUS P. BROWNING, ET AL., PROTEST Is NOT ENOUGH: THE STRUGGLE OF BLACKS
AND HISPANICS FOR EQUALITY IN URBAN POLITICS 24-45 (1984) (arguing that political incorporation and
policy responsiveness are more important measures of political equality than the simple fact of representa-
tion).
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ity population, it may be better to have minorities influence electoral outcomes
in several districts, rather than determine the outcome in only one."
Another proposal for assuring minority representation is a system of
proportional representation (PR).39 Most versions of PR offer this clear crite-
rion for representation: they allow groups to elect candidates in proportion to
their population in the electorate. But a judicial requirement for nationwide PR
would set off an enormous constitutional change.' Moreover, in legislative
decisions governed by majority rule PR would not assure any influence for
those minorities whom it is intended to benefit. Indeed, in the legislature PR
might greatly empower quite different minorities than those it intends to
protect. Policy outcomes under PR depend upon how governing coalitions are
formed.
Edward Still's article, Voluntary Constituencies: Modified At-Large Voting
as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution in Judicial Elections,"' addresses the
problem of minority vote dilution in at-large judicial elections, an issue recent-
ly decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.42 Still argues that cumulative and
limited voting might remedy minority vote dilution in at-large electoral dis-
tricts.43 These remedies would create proportional voting in at-large judicial
elections." Although Still may correctly characterize the nature of district
court judicial elections as significantly different from that of legislative elec-
tions, proportional representation as a remedy for violations of section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act constitutes a very long reach for our political system.
3. Vote dilution and gerrymandering. The reapportionment cases of the
early 1960s called attention to a problem of representative democracy in states
where a minority of voters controlled state legislatures. Two avenues were
open to the courts to overcome this deficiency. The first was to invoke the
Guaranty Clause of the Constitution.4' The other was to rely on the Equal
Protection Clause,' the rationale the Supreme Court pursued.
The language of the Equal Protection Clause offers a single criterion:
equality, a logical extension of which was the principle of "one person, one
38. THERNSTROM, supra note 35, at 243-44 (multiethnic election districts can create strong political
incentives to include minorities in political process and reduce causes of interethnic conflict).
39. See, e.g., Dana Carstarphen, Current Topic, The Single Transferable Vote: Achieving the Goals
of Section 2 Without Sacrificing the Integration Ideal, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 405 (1991) (proposing
form of proportional representation to address underlying goals of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
40. See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 254-56 (describingjudicial imposition of proportional representation
as "nuclear disaster scenario" resulting in "the most major and fundamental amendment to the Constitution
since the Fourteenth Amendment.").
41. 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 354 (1991).
42. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991) (holding that vote
dilution provision of Voting Rights Act applies to election of trial judges).
43. Still, supra note 41, at 366-67.
44. Id.
45. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1. ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government . . ").
46. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
Vol. 9:190, 1991
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vote."'47 "One person, one vote" was meant to promote majority control in
the states. But, as soon as it was announced, it was used to thwart an over-
whelming majority in the State of Colorado which, through ballot initiative,
chose to apportion one state house by population and the other by county.4
To the majority of voters in Colorado, who wanted their state legislature to
reflect the unique political geography of a state with one major metropolitan
area and small populations scattered across the plains and cloistered in moun-
tain valleys, the Supreme Court now had only one response: "one person, one
vote. 49
What might have happened if the Court had chosen the Guaranty Clause,
which declares that states must provide their citizens "a republican form of
government"?5" By recognizing that minority regimes in contravention of their
47. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568-76 (1964). Although the Court has pursued this single
criterion quite an extraordinary distance, it still has yet fully to resolve some important issues governing
its application. For example, does "one person, one vote" mean apportionment by population or the right
to an equally weighted vote? See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 779-88 (9th Cir. 1990),
(Kozinski, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (apportionment by population and apportionment by
number of voters "are based on radically different premises and serve materially different purposes."),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 681 (1991); see also BRUCE CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT P-JZZLE 57-59 (1984)
(discussing differences in weight of vote in equally populous districts with differing numbers of voters).
Where there are disparities in the underlying population and number of voters, the two standards are in
conflict. This issue clearly affects the appropriate remedy for instances of minority vote dilution. Those
interested in electing a .minority candidate through the creation of a minority district need to calculate
carefully the number of minority voters, not merely the minority population, in order to assure that minority
strength is sufficient to elect minority candidates. See William A. V. Clark and Peter A. Morrison,
Demographic Paradoxes in the Los Angeles Voting Rights Case, 15 EVALUATION REV. (forthcoming 1991)
(manuscript at 4, on file with authors).
48. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
49. Colorado's geography makes representation very difficult. Jim Johnson, a Republican representa-
tive from Colorado's fourth congressional district in the 1970s once noted that he really served four
different districts. In describing the disparities, Johnson observed, "'The far east is mostly concerned with
agriculture, the foothills of the mountains on the east are suburban; the mountain area on the continental
divide is mostly tourist, a resort area and small mountain towns that are ranching-oriented and the far west
is agriculture and mineral development'" RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., WATCHING POLITICIANS: ESSAYS ON
PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 103 (1990) (quoting Jim Johnson). As Richard Fenno notes,
[tihe nature of these interests put [Johnson] in the middle of some of the toughest issues of the 1970s-
energy, environment, natural resources....
To complaining cattlemen on the western slope, he said that the dairymen on the eastern
slope were worse off. To people in favor of the West Divide Reclamation Project, he said that the
people who worried about flooding beautiful country had a point. He told people on the western slope
that the Denver Water Board had reasonable people on it; and on the eastern slope he told people it
was unfair for them to keep water from the western slope farmers who needed it when Denver had
no need for it now. He regularly told one group that another group in the district had a different view-
point-trying always to engender that essential tolerance, constituent to constituent as well as constitu-
ent to congressman.
Id. at 103, 109.
50. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, ci. 1. We do not offer this radical proposal naively. The Court has held
that the Guaranty Clause is usually nonjusticiable. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (holding
guaranty clause gave Congress, not the Court, sole authority to decide what was lawful authority in Rhode
Island during Dorr Rebellion); Taylor & Marshall v. Beckham (No. 1), 178 U.S. 548 (1900) (holding non-
jusiticiable claim that state's resolution of contested election deprived voters of republican form of
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own constitutions5t did not provide a republican form of government, the
Court could have started moving incrementally towards a Guaranty Clause
jurisprudence in the way it gropes its way toward the statement of most
doctrines: case by case. The Guaranty Clause could have allowed judges to
take into account not just the size of a population, but also the extent of its
distribution into discrete communities. Indeed, there are many other factors
related to republican government that courts could consider in apportionment.
These factors include adherence to state constitutional provisions, the ap-
propriateness of a legislative decision to protect incumbents in order to pre-
serve the state's political power at the national level, the need to create more
competitive elections in order to increase legislative "responsiveness," and the
need for flexibility when creating new or specialized governmental institutions.
Consideration of such factors is difficult and perhaps impossible if courts are
required to attend only to "one person, one vote."
For example, consider the desire to protect state interests in a federal
system. State A, being quite homogeneous and politically stable, sends the
same representatives to Congress year after year. These representatives acquire
government); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (holding nonjusticiable claim
that initiative and referendum negated republican form of government); Kiernan v. Portland, 223 U.S. 151
(1912) (same); Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250 (1913) (holding nonjusticiable claim that state constitutional
amendment procedure negated republican government); O'Neil v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244 (1915) (holding
nonjusticiable claim that delegation to court to form drainage districts negated republican government);
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (holding nonjusticiable claim that state's
workmen's compensation act violates republican government); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park
Dist., 281 U.S. 74 (1930) (holding nonjusticiable claim that rule requiring concurrence of all but one state
court judge to find law unconstitutional negated republican government); Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew,
300 U.S. 608 (1937) (rejection of claim that delegation to agency of power to control milk prices violated
republican government); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (holding nonjusticiable claim that
malapportionment of congressional district violated republican government); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962) (Court refuses to consider challenge to malapportionment of state legislature under guaranty clause).
But the Court has not held that the guaranty clause is absolutely nonjusticiable. See id. at 222 n.48 (citing
cases where Court refused to overturn state practices under guaranty clause, but gave sufficient discussion
of Clause to suggest that cases were decided under it).
The usual reason advanced for refusing to adjudicate under the guaranty clause has been a lack of
judicially manageable standards. See, e.g., id. at 223 ("Guaranty Clause is not a repository of judicially
manageable standards which a court could utilize independently"). But we argue that judicially manageable
standards may fail to deal with the complexity of the institutions they affect. It seems to us that the claim
of nonjusticiability of the guaranty clause was one of many tools that the courts used in order to avoid
deciding issues it thought were best left to the other branches of government. Since courts are now more
active than they used to be, and since many judicially manageable standards when used alone may be
inappropriate for the intricacies of electoral institutions, it may be worth reconsidering whether the guaranty
clause gives judges room to consider other and more relevant factors than voting equality in evaluating
the design of representative bodies.
51. It is rarely noted that failure to comply with state constitutional provisions was a central issue in
the litigation leading to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961) (voter challenge to Tennessee's legislative
districting justiciable under equal protection clause). The malapportionment of Tennessee's legislative
districts in 1961 was largely due to the failure to reapportion those districts since 1901, despite the fact
that the Tennessee constitution specifically provided for decennial reapportionment. See id. at 188-91.
Although we suggest that the Guaranty Clause may allow federal courts to consider the issue of compliance
with state constitutional provisions, state supreme courts should continue to be the final arbiters of their
own constitutions.
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seniority and enjoy a great advantage in dealing with less senior representatives
from other states. This creates an incentive for the legislature of State B, a
more heterogeneous state, to draw its district lines so as to protect as many
of its incumbent members of Congress as possible, in the hope of improving
its competitive standing in Washington. In this manner, reducing competition
for House seats may increase political competition nationally, and may actually
benefit a larger population.
Examples of incumbent protection by state legislatures are, of course,
legion. The Texas legislature protected House Speaker Sam Rayburn for many
years. Rayburn's district at the time of his death was the second smallest in
population in the nation (the smallest being the district covering Michigan's
upper peninsula) and adjacent to one of the largest districts, covering Dallas.
It is not obvious that the people of Dallas were ill-served by this arrangement
even though it ostensibly diluted their political influence.
Or consider the need for flexibility and inducement when creating in-
novative governmental institutions. Many people in the San Francisco Bay
Area, where we live, are worried about the deteriorating standard of living.
One proposal that addresses this issue seeks to establish a regional government
that can deal with issues such as transportation, the environment, and
growth.52 Although its powers would in some respects be limited, this govern-
ment, which would exercise important governmental functions, would likely
only be considered politically legitimate if it were elected. But small outlying
cities, which might consider themselves disproportionately affected by the
decisions of such a government, have no incentive to opt into such a system
if it is assured that they will always be outvoted on issues that concern
them.53 As was clear in the classic debate in the federal convention of 1787
leading to the Connecticut Compromise, those favoring some centralized
control need to be able to provide assurances or incentives to small communi-
ties before they will enter the system. Thus, any effective coordination may
be possible only if there is some type of representation by town. A Bay Area
regional government based on representation by towns or counties might
arguably guarantee to its citizens a republican form of government, and thereby
pass constitutional muster according to an approach in which more than one
criterion of acceptability is consulted. But, under the monotonic doctrine of
"one person, one vote," such a governmental instrument could not meet consti-
tutional standards. Is it better for such a device never to be created?
52. BAY VISION 2020 COMMISSION: THE COMMISSION REPORT (1991) (proposing a regional commis-
sion for the San Francisco Bay Area to coordinate regulation of air quality, transportation, and housing).
53. An early anticipation of this problem is Edward C. Banfield, The Politics of Metropolitan Area
Organization, 1 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 77 (1957).
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Our brother Polsby and Popper's elegant article, The Third Criterion,-4
offers the judiciary a single criterion to remedy one of the major complaints
lodged against partisan gerrymandering, the highly suspect lack of compactness
of districts. They advise using the compactness standard merely as a rebuttable
presumption, thus avoiding the dangers of single-mindedly pursuing a single
criterion such as has notoriously occurred in the case of the "one person, one
vote" doctrine. The use of this presumption would theoretically allow politi-
cians to justify districting in terms of criteria such as existing political bound-
aries, geographically bounded communities, and the goals of the Voting Rights
Act, but not self-preservation. We wonder, however, if judges will employ the
criterion in the suggested way, or if the legal availability of a simple measure
of compactness will override all other considerations in determining the
acceptability of the shapes of districts. The history of the closely related
criterion of equal population can give no comfort. It seems to us only a matter
of time before the single criterion of compactness produces its judicial equiva-
lent of Karcher v. Daggett. 55 It is very easy to overstate the need for judicial
supervision of the inherently political business of redistricting. The most recent
empirical evidence suggests that the cumulative effect of partisan gerrymander-
ing seems to wash out nationally, 6 and partisan gerrymanders have proved
to be far from lasting.57 Thus what Polsby and Popper have given us may be
more solution than the problem requires.
Additionally, compactness as a desideratum for legislative districts is
becoming positively unfashionable in the face of demands for minority-
dominated seats and perfect equality of district sizes. Congressional Quarterly
reports on an official, computer-drawn congressional redistricting in North
Carolina "that looks like a Rorschach test, with boundaries that loop and snake
and twist through the state, splitting counties, cities, towns and even fourteen
precincts; two new districts intersect at a geometric point-known as the
'double crossover.'" 58 The real story in North Carolina is not the grotesque-
ness of the shapes of districts-although virtually all of the twelve districts are
in fact grotesquely shaped. What these shapes attest to is not merely lack of
compactness but, more significantly, the disregard of all bases for the construc-
54. Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural
Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 301 (1991).
55. 462 U.S. 725 (1983). Karcher invalidated a New Jersey congressional districting plan where the
deviations between districts was less than one percent, which was less than the margin of error in the census
data used, because the state had failed to make a "good faith effort to achieve precise mathematical
equality" in population among its congressional districts. Id. at 744. In other words, the Court wanted the
districts to be drawn more precisely than the available data would allow.
56. GARY C. JACOBSON, THE ELECTORAL ORIGINS OF DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 94-96 (1990).
57. DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 8 (1991).
58. Beth Donovan, North Carolina ComputerDraws Some Labyrinthine Lines, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.,
July 13, 1991, at 1916.
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tion of political community other than race and incumbency.59 The presump-
tion that geographic proximity leads to interests in common may in fact be
totally wrong. Or it may not be. Confiding the drawing of lines to the legisla-
ture instead of a computer, as the North Carolina constitution provides,"
leaves decisions about how to construct the political communities to which
North Carolina's representatives in Congress are individually responsible in
the hands of persons who are capable of invoking diverse criteria, not merely
the one or two (equal population, safe-minority districts) that have been
selected for emphasis by courts. The legislature, however, added only one
criterion to the computer program: incumbent protection. Contiguity and com-
pactness, having no current judicial advocates, went by the boards.
Will the discovery of Polsby and Popper that compactness can be judicially
managed cause judges to insist on compactness? Will this cause legislatures
to abandon incumbent protection? No doubt some observers will welcome this
added constraint upon elected politicians. One wonders how state constitutions
could have been so badly written as to neglect to provide directly for judicial
supervision of reapportionment.
III. CAN MULTIPLE CRITERIA SALVAGE
THE DOCTRINE OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION?
The rationale for the sort of judicial behavior variously called "judicial
restraint," or "modesty," to which we generally subscribe, is that unelected
officials ought, in a democracy, to defer in their judgments to elected officials
on matters in which political judgments may constitutionally vary. The doctrine
of the political question was developed in part as a way of identifying those
empirical instances in which judicial deference was regarded as particularly
appropriate. As the number of such instances has diminished, it becomes
necessary in effect to rewrite the code of judicial behavior so as to minimize
the ill effects from the standpoint of democratic theory.
One signpost that has been relied upon in the course of increased judicial
involvement is strict adherence to one judicially manageable principle at a
time. This has created problems. If judges are going to participate more
vigorously in the dispensation and alteration of political benefits and penalties,
they had better do so with their wits about them, and not delude themselves
into thinking that close adherence to one glorious principle at a time will avoid
the most trouble.
59. Id. at 1916-17.
60. See N.C. CONST., art. II, § 5; cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-201 (Supp. 1990) (act of General
Assembly specifying congressional districts following the 1980 census).
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Life is filled with circumstances in which responsible decision makers must
attend to more than one value to arrive at outcomes.6' Courts must do the
same, especially when they enter the political arena. Thus:
(1) Limiting expenditures of money may actually work against the goal of
"leveling the playing field" as between incumbents and challengers in contests
for elective office. The unrestrained use of money may actually be the best
way for non-incumbents to get into the game.62
(2) Increasing the influence of historically disadvantaged demographic
minorities may require the establishment of a protected, minority-dominated
district, or it may require distributing minority votes into several districts.63
(3) The requirement of equally populated congressional districts may be
so easy to manage judicially as to inspire courts to micro-manage along this
particular line. Requiring a republican form of government, by contrast, might
have prevented the court from doing more than it needed to do in order to
persuade a state to follow its own constitution."4
In all these instances, we think the simple answer was not necessarily the
right answer, and that courts might have done less inadvertent harm while
coming roughly to the same conclusions by attending to multiple criteria in
their decisionmaking. Vigorous judicial intervention into the political process
requires a philosophy of jurisprudence that is broadly attentive to the conse-
quences of what judges do.
If courts are going to decide political questions it is better that they make
explicit trade-offs among considerations such as these than that they proceed
as though no such trade-offs are entailed in the choices they make. This, at
any rate, is the basis for our belief that they must attend to a suitable range
of criteria in their decisionmaking, and hesitate to follow the single-valued
courses of action so frequently pressed upon them.
61. Stephen Gottlieb's article reminds us that election reform is one of those areas. Gottlieb, supra
note 19.
62. Polsby, supra note 9; see also supra text accompanying notes 25-33.
63. THERNSTROM, supra note 35; see also supra text accompanying notes 34-44.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 45-57.
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